The Agreement of the Mujtahids and Its Impact on the Formation of Consensus

Abstract

The transmission of ijmāʿ (consensus) in many juristic issues is sometimes presented by certain scholars as merely the opinion of the majority (jumhūr), while others may classify it as a binding consensus. This discrepancy in transmission has led some researchers to regard such attributions as lacking precision and, at times, as a source of confusion in reporting juristic views. It is not uncommon for multiple opinions to be attributed to a single imām; consequently, some scholars opt to prefer one narration or opinion over others, whereas others transmit these narrations without any preference. Such circumstances necessitate a thorough study that addresses the definition of the term ijmāʿ, and examines whether its validity requires the agreement of all mujtahids, or whether the agreement of the majority suffices—such that dissent by a minority would not affect the claim of consensus. This topic is of great importance, as ijmāʿ, in its general sense, constitutes a fundamental legal source within Islamic jurisprudence across the various Islamic schools of thought, despite their differences regarding certain details. Consequently, consensus plays a significant role in legal reasoning, particularly in cases where no clear evidence is found in the Qurʾān or the Sunnah. Accordingly, we find that some scholars, when transmitting a particular opinion, assert that it is established by consensus. However, upon examining the roots of the disagreement, one may discover that the issue in question was in fact disputed by some jurists—even if their number was small. Nevertheless, the existence of such disagreement means that a consensus, in the literal linguistic sense of the term, was not actually achieved. For this reason, I have divided this study into two sections. The first addresses the meaning of ijmāʿ, its authoritative status, and its various types. The second examines the views of legal theorists (uṣūliyyūn) regarding the requirement of unanimous agreement among all mujtahids. At the conclusion of the study, several findings were reached, including the following: • Ijmāʿ is, in general terms, a binding legal proof. • Legal theorists differed over the issue of whether the existence of dissent among some mujtahids affects the validity of consensus, expressing more than ten distinct opinions; the strongest of these views holds that the agreement of all mujtahids is a condition for the validity of ijmāʿ. • As a result of this disagreement concerning the requirement of unanimity, we can better understand why some scholars describe certain issues as being established by consensus, even though they merely represent the opinion of the majority. And our final supplication is that all praise is due to God, Lord of the worlds, and may God’s peace and blessings be upon His trustworthy Prophet, and upon his family and all his companions.